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Doesconsciousreﬂectionleadtogooddecision-making?Whereasengaginginreﬂection
is traditionally thought to be the best way to make wise choices, recent psychological
evidence undermines the role of reﬂection in lay and expert judgement. The literature
suggests that thinking about reasons does not improve the choices people make, and
that experts do not engage in reﬂection, but base their judgements on intuition, often
shaped by extensive previous experience. Can we square the traditional accounts of
wisdom with the results of these empirical studies? Should we even attempt to? I shall
defend the view that philosophy and cognitive sciences genuinely interact in tackling
questions such as whether reﬂection leads to making wise choices.
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1. Introduction
Philosophers and cognitive scientists seem to engage in a lively dialogue. For instance,
empirical evidence on human reasoning has informed recent debates on human rationality,
and studies on the limitations of introspection have led to reappraising strengths and weak-
nesses of self-knowledge. When philosophers address traditional questions such as: “Are
humans rational?” or “Should we trust introspection?” they can beneﬁt from paying atten-
tion to research in cognitive science. Similarly, when psychologists aim at answering
empirical questions about capacities and limitations of human cognition, they often ﬁnd
it useful to start from an analysis of past and contemporary work in the philosophy of
mind and epistemology.
One of the contributions of the cognitive sciences consists in debunking myths and
suggesting the need for subtler distinctions in the assessment of human capacities. For
instance, we may discover that performance in probabilistic reasoning is affected by how
the tasks are formulated (Hertwig and Gigerenzer 1999), or that via introspection, one
can reliably identify the nature, but not the causes, of one’s emotions (Wilson and Dunn
2004). However, the claim that philosophy and cognitive sciences genuinely interact is con-
troversial. Stone and Davies (1993, 590–1 and 619) discuss four possible conceptions of
the relationship between cognitive science and philosophy. In traditional accounts of this
relationship, the domain of philosophy and the domain of cognitive science are kept dis-
tinct. Philosophy deals with those questions that can be answered a priori, while science
addresses empirical issues. Although this conception of the relative tasks of the philosopher
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Other ways of understanding the relationship between philosophy and sciences encou-
rage a very narrow view of the remit of philosophy. Either the philosopher is called to shed
light on those issues that non-mature sciences struggle to deal with, or she is merely asked
to disentangle conceptual confusions. On the former view, philosophy “lives on borrowed
time” (Stone and Davies 1993, 590): when a scientiﬁc discipline becomes mature enough to
deal with a particular area of investigation with its own resources, the role of the philoso-
pher is exhausted. On the latter view, philosophy has an important but merely critical role.
Fortunately, there is a fourth way: science and philosophy, with their often distinct method-
ologies, can genuinely engage in a two-way interaction and advance understanding of a
number of thorny problems. According to the fourth option, philosophy and cognitive
sciences are on equal footing: they inform and constrain each other.
I hope to show in this paper that the attempt to clarify whether conscious reﬂection leads
to wise choices lends plausibility to the fourth conception of the interaction between philo-
sophers and cognitive scientists. There is an obvious job for cognitive scientists to do:
results emerging from studies on reﬂection contribute to understanding causal mechanisms
that could not be properly investigated by a priori reasoning or naturalistic observation of
behaviour. Such results can feed back into philosophical theories of wisdom and make them
more psychologically realistic. But there is also a job for philosophers to do: they can
examine the implications of the relevant empirical results for normative claims and interpret
the data on reﬂection in the light of the interests that we have in good decision-making.
In section 2, I shall brieﬂy highlight the importance of some key elements in both classic
and contemporary accounts of wisdom. These include good decision-making, self-knowl-
edge, and the integration of diverse skills in the solution of familiar and novel problems. Do
these capacities require conscious reﬂection?
In section 3, I shall summarise the results of psychological studies on introspective
reﬂection and narrative self-construction. These undermine the role of reﬂection in
making good choices and in gaining self-knowledge, given that providing reasons for
one’s choices does not seem to improve the quality of said choices or to offer an insight
into the process of decision-making. But a careful interpretation of the results does not
condemn reﬂection altogether. Rather, it suggests that some forms of reﬂection may not
be beneﬁcial in some contexts.
In section 4, I shall refer to the psychological literature on expertise, according to which
intuition, shaped by extensive previous experience and crystallised into habit, is at play in
the making of expert choice and problem solving. Although there is much tolearn from a re-
assessment of the role of reﬂection in this area, perceptual and recognitional skills required
in expert choice often need to be adjusted and calibrated in the light of the information
coming from the environment. This suggests that there is a role for analysis.
In the ﬁnal section, I shall draw some conclusions from the discussion of the psycho-
logical literature and its interpretation. I shall also return to the methodological issues I
started with and defend the view that, via genuine collaboration, philosophers and cognitive
scientists can arrive at a more satisfactory theory of what contributes to wise choices.
2. Wise choices: reﬂection or intuition?
Conceptions of wisdom are by no means universal and thus wisdom is hard to deﬁne, but
some key character traits and epistemic qualities seem to be attributed to the wise person
across thinkers, cultures, and ages. Let me start with an example of someone being unwise.
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who has lost both her parents. She travels with her aunt to Europe. In England, she is much
admired for her beauty and her personality. She rejects two advantageous marriage propo-
sals from sensible and caring men, as she sees marriage as a trap and she wants to experi-
ence life as an adventure and to make her own destiny. After she inherits a fortune from her
uncle, she travels to Italy and becomes prey to the schemes of Gilbert Osmond and Madame
Merle who set their eyes on Isabel’s money. Isabel does not realise that Madame Merle and
Osmond are not to be trusted, and accepts her friendship and his offer of marriage against
everybody’s advice. Not only does she stubbornly refuse to listen to the warnings of friends
and family, but she rushes into the marriage without making time to get to know Osmond
herself. Her decision to become Osmond’s wife is in open conﬂict with her intention not to
marry young, and thus she goes against her previous judgement. The effects of her choice
are disastrous, when Osmond reveals himself as a talentless art-lover with expensive tastes,
and an overbearing deceitful husband who does not truly appreciate Isabel and does not
respect her freedom. Isabel does not have the beneﬁt of experience as a judge of character,
and she does not make the important decisions in her life in a careful, considered manner.
She shows intelligence, independence of thought, and strength of character on many
occasions, but her choice of a husband is something that she then comes to regret. Isabel
did not choose wisely.
In this example, we can ﬁnd some clues as to what wisdom requires. One key element is
that wisdom encompasses both thought and action: it is primarily manifested in the
capacity to make good choices. In Plato’s Republic, we are told that the wise person con-
templates the truth and is free from prejudice, and acts in a way that is informed by her
knowledge. The unwise person, instead, uncritically accepts other people’s opinions as
true, without engaging in personal reﬂection or independent thought. In Aristotle’s philos-
ophy, there is a distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom. The latter is identiﬁed
with a special sort of perceptual knowledge that is acquired via one’s lived experiences.
Again, making good choices is at the core of this view of wisdom. In the words of
Martha Nussbaum:
Practical insight is like perceiving in the sense that it is non-inferential, non-deductive; it is,
centrally, the ability to recognize, acknowledge, respond to, pick out certain salient features
of a complex situation. And just as the theoretical nous comes only out of a long experience
with ﬁrst principles and a sense, gained gradually in and through experience, of the fundamen-
tal role played by these principles in discourse and explanation, so too practical perception,
which Aristotle also calls nous, is gained only through a process of living and choosing that
develops the agent’s resourcefulness and responsiveness. (Nussbaum 2001, 305)
Another key feature of the wise person is represented by the Socrates of The apology:
the wise person has knowledge of herself and her own limitations, exhibits epistemic humi-
lity and constantly strives to improve herself. This Socratic theme, which has not gone out
of fashion in accounts of wisdom, suggests a particular way of conceiving of the unwise, as
someone affected by hubris. In many contemporary accounts of wisdom, the wise person
recognises her limitations (Taranto 1989, 15), both the limitations that are part and parcel
of the human condition and the limitations due to her own individual characteristics.
Whereas the wise person knows that she/he does not know, the unwise person does not
realise what the limits of her knowledge are and thus may make decisions on the basis
of insufﬁcient information, reject valuable advice, and think of her/himself as superior
to others without good reason. In several areas of inquiry, for instance, the philosophy of
education and professional ethics, critical reﬂection on one’s thought and practice is
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willingness to improve oneself (Scho ¨n 1987).
In classic and contemporary philosophical and psychological accounts, wisdom is often
described as multidimensional, requiring the integration of different skills, some of which
need to have been practised for some time in order to be properly mastered – explaining, in
part, the common sense association of wisdom with advanced age or, at least, extensive
experience. Wisdom is often characterised by the “good use” of skills that contribute to
solving problems in familiar and novel circumstances, and to intelligent behaviour in
general. These skills include good reasoning, good judgement, and the capacity to learn
from other people and from the environment. Being sagacious and perspicacious are
often considered distinctive traits of the wise person, who is creative, rejects dogmatism,
acknowledges her own fallibility, and is willing to doubt (Meacham 1990, 189; Sternberg
and Lubart 2001, 502). In this context, lack of wisdom is characterised either as the failure
to acquire knowledge in the ﬁrst place, or as the acquisition of knowledge that is not put to
good use, due to lack of experience, sagacity, or perspicacity.
There are as many deﬁnitions of wisdom as authors who attempt to understand what
wisdom is – Birren and Fisher (1990, 325–6) collect 13 deﬁnitions in as many contri-
butions to an edited collection on the psychology of wisdom. But the key elements we
listed above are almost constantly present and can also be found to some extent in Tiberius
and Swartwood’sdescription of the folk conception of wisdom:
Wisdom is the will and the ability to make good choices and help guide others to do so in virtue
of a deep understanding of complex human problems that one has arrived at through reﬂection
and experience. (Tiberius and Swartwood, this issue, xx)
Here I want to focus on the capacity to make good choices, gain self-knowledge, and
solve problems, which are core elements of many scientiﬁc and folk conceptions of
wisdom. In particular, I am interested in whether wise choices are arrived at by conscious
reﬂection or by intuition and experience – a theme that was already discussed by the con-
temporaries of Plato and Aristotle and that is the object of current controversy. Results
emerging from research programmes in cognitive and social psychology have recently
informed philosophical accounts of decision-making by showing that some forms of reﬂec-
tion are not conducive to good choices.
One preliminary issue is what reﬂection and intuition are. Intuition is a process that, like
reﬂection, can generate attitudes and decisions but that, unlike reﬂection, does not involve
any conscious weighing of reasons in favour or against a particular attitude or decision (e.g.
Kahneman 2003; Gigerenzer 2007).
Reasoning is done deliberately and effortfully, but intuitive thoughts seem to come spon-
taneously to mind, without conscious search or computation, and without effort. Casual obser-
vation and systematic research indicate that most thoughts and actions are normally intuitive in
this sense. (Kahneman 2003, 1450)
Apart from the basic features above (spontaneity, lack of conscious access, effortless-
ness), intuition is described differently in different research programmes. The type of intui-
tion contemporary social scientists focus on is sometimes explained in terms of the non-
conscious operation of “quick-and-dirty” (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Gilovich,
Grifﬁn, and Kahneman 2002) or “fast and frugal” (Gigerenzer, Todd, and ABC Research
Groups 1999; Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2002) heuristics that provide computationally
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described as a non-inferential form of insight that builds on, and is made possible by, exten-
sive prior experience (e.g. Dreyfus 1997; Osbeck and Robinson 2005). In discussions about
the psychology of expertise, decision-makers are said to make judgements through intui-
tion, in a way that does not require conscious thought or inference. The expert develops
habits that guide her/him in choosing what to say and what to do.
The expert driver, generally without any awareness, not only knows by feel and familiarity
when slowing down on an off ramp is required; the foot performs the appropriate action
without the driver having to calculate and compare alternatives. [...] [W]ith talent and a
great deal of involved experience, the beginner develops into an expert who intuitively sees
what to do without applying rules. (Dreyfus 2007, 23)
The distinctive earmarks of intuition are rapid response (a matter of seconds) and inability of
the respondent to report a sequence of steps leading to the result – even denial of awareness
of such steps. [...] what impresses observers about intuition is that responses, especially
those of experts, are frequently correct even though they seem to have required almost no pro-
cessing time or effort. (March and Simon 1993, 11)
When reﬂection is discussed in the psychological literature, it is not always accounted
for consistently from study to study, but primarily deﬁned in contrast with intuition. Reﬂec-
tion is the conscious, explicit search for reasons occurring in deliberation or justiﬁcation.
Whereas the mechanisms leading up to intuitive judgements are usually described as
opaque to introspection, reﬂective judgements are thought to be open to introspection
and, thus, people can be expected to report on what they are doing while deliberating or
justifying.
3. Decision-making and self-knowledge
Psychological evidence has recently suggested that reﬂection is not always conducive to
good decision-making and to self-knowledge. In a variety of cases, reﬂection has been
found to compromise rather than promote good decision-making. Good decisions are
often made not by consciously weighing the reasons in favour and against a certain
course of action, but through intuition. The literature on personal narratives seems to
show that reﬂection is, in some cases, detrimental to the construction of coherent self-con-
ceptions and thus compromises autonomous thought and action. As both good decision-
making and self-knowledge are key elements of wisdom, this literature has the potential
to impact on philosophical accounts of the wise person.
Here are some examples of the turn against reﬂection:
Conscious thought has shortcomings that can prevent sound decision making. First of all, con-
scious thought can lead to suboptimal weighting of the importance of aspects of different
choice alternatives. In addition, because consciousness has low capacity, conscious thought
often leads people to take into account only a limited subset of information at the expense
of other information that should be taken into account when making a decision. (Dijksterhuis
and van Olden 2006, 628)
It is common for people to analyze why they feel the way they do [...]. It is usually assumed
that such reﬂection is beneﬁcial, leading to greater insight about how one feels. We will argue
the reverse; that is, that this type of self-analysis can mislead people about their attitudes,
thereby lowering attitude–behavior correlations. (Wilson et al. 1984, 5)
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of reﬂection are found wanting and why. This requires a careful examination of the pro-
cesses studied under the general label of reﬂection, and of the circumstances in which
reﬂection is used. Deliberation and justiﬁcation on the basis of reasons are thought to
have negative consequences for either the quality of decision-making or for self-knowl-
edge. In particular, the following phenomena are observed: attitudes are less stable when
people are asked to analyse reasons for those attitudes, leading to attitude/attitude incon-
sistencies (e.g. Wilson and Hodges 1993); when attitudes and choices are arrived at via
reason-giving, the attitudes reported or the choices made are less optimal with respect to
expert opinion and more vulnerable to evidence manipulation than the attitudes reported
or the choices made without giving reasons (e.g. Wilson and Schooler 1991); when an atti-
tude is reported after analysing reasons, it generates inaccurate prediction of behaviour due
to attitude/behaviour inconsistencies (e.g. Wilson and Kraft 1993); when people give
reasons for their attitudes or decisions, they seem to ignore the mechanisms underlying
the formation of their attitude or their decision-making (e.g. Haidt 2001).
Given the variety of negative effects the studies have revealed, the temptation is to
dismiss reﬂection altogether, and the popularised reports of these studies (see Gladwell
2005; Gigerenzer 2007) have emphasised the importance of following one’s intuitions
versus engaging in slow and deliberate thought. However, this blanket recommendation
is not justiﬁed on the basis of the results of the studies mentioned above. It does not dis-
criminate between good and bad deliberative and justiﬁcatory processes and between the
uses of reﬂection in different contexts (see Bortolotti 2009). There is a more sensible
take on the relationship between introspective reﬂection and quality of decisions. For
instance, one thought is that not all the information one needs in order to come to a
good decision is easily accessible to introspection. As a result, investigating reasons
through conscious reﬂection may not always be the best way to proceed, as some key
factors can be neglected. The challenge, then, is to be able to identify the circumstances
in which reﬂection is beneﬁcial or even required, given that it is not always recommended.
We live well, according to Plato, when the rational part of our soul (the charioteer) is in charge
of the appetites and the emotions (the chariot). You do your best when your rational self has the
reins. [...] But it turns out that the rational or reﬂective self isn’t all that good a charioteer after
all. Recent investigations in empirical psychology show us that the self-conscious, rational pro-
cessor is more fallible than we imagined. (Tiberius 2008, 4)
Tiberius (2008) takes into account the limitations of introspection highlighted by
psychological evidence, but does not completely dismiss the role of reﬂection in the attain-
ment of wisdom. According to her theory, the wise person needs to know when a shift in
perspective is required, and at times reﬂection is the means by which a new perspective
takes hold. At other times, the shift is guided by instinct and habit and does not require
any explicit deliberation.
What takes wisdom is shifting perspectives at the right time, in the right way, and for the right
reasons; this is the kind of attentional ﬂexibility that counts as a reﬂective virtue. The wise
person is open to perspective shifts when it is appropriate to do so. (Tiberius 2008, 79)
When she examines the nature of the psychological evidence, Tiberius is careful not to
overlook the beneﬁts of reﬂection. She recognises that reﬂection is not always conducive to
a better understanding of how one arrives at certain attitudes and choices. But she also
views reﬂection as an important means by which to interpret such attitudes and choices
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She stresses that self-knowledge is not made up by a collection of accurate facts about
oneself that need to be discovered, but is achieved via the construction of a narrative in
which apparently disjointed facts are glossed until they make sense as a whole.
The process of acquiring self-knowledge [...] is complicated by the fact that reﬂecting on our
psychology can change the objects of this reﬂection and by the fact that certain parts of our
psychology are opaque to us. These two features of the process of acquiring self-knowledge
make it the case that we cannot see this process as one of simple introspection and discovery.
(Tiberius 2008, 121)
Because our commitments are disorderly, uninterpreted, and changeable [...], there is an inevi-
table element of creation in the process of acquiring self-knowledge. (Tiberius 2008, 117)
When does creation become confabulation? Psychologists have shown that attempts at
justiﬁcation of attitudes and choices sometimes collapse into forms of confabulation. For
instance, Haidt (2001) maintains that, when people condemn a scenario in which incest
occurs, they are blind to what determined their attitude (according to Haidt’s theory, a reac-
tion of disgust), and come up with reasons that not only did not cause their attitude, but also
badly ﬁt with the features of the scenario with which they were presented.
“Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are travelling together in France on summer
vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They
decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At very least it would
be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark
uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do
it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each
other. What do you think about that, was it OK for them to make love?”
Most people who hear the above story immediately say that it was wrong for the siblings to
make love, and they then set about searching for reasons. They point out the dangers of
inbreeding, only to remember that Julie and Mark used two forms of birth control. They
argue that Julie and Mark will be hurt, perhaps emotionally, even though the story makes it
clear that no harm befell them. (Haidt 2001, 814)
Similarly, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) argue that, when people explain why they chose
the pair of socks to their right as opposed to the (identical) pair of socks to their left, they are
blind to the position effect that inﬂuenced their choice, and instead support their choices
with inaccurate claims about the chosen socks being softer and brighter.
Subjects in a shopping mall were presented with an array of four sets of items (e.g. pairs of
socks, or pantyhose), and they were asked to choose one of them as a free sample. (All four
sets of items were actually identical.) Subjects displayed a marked tendency to select the
item on the right-hand end of the display. Yet, no one mentioned this when they were asked
to explain why they had chosen as they did. Rather, subjects produced plainly confabulated
explanations, such as that the item they had chosen was softer, it had appeared to be better
made, or that it had a more attractive colour. (Carruthers 2005, 142–3)
In the studies cited above, research participants had no introspective access to infor-
mation about how their moral judgements or personal preferences were formed and thus,
when they were asked to provide reasons for them, they confabulated (Bortolotti and
Cox 2009). What we can derive from these results is that thinking about reasons can
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attitudes were actually formed. This seems to suggest a failure of self-knowledge – if we
rely on a demanding notion of self-knowledge. People know their attitudes and choices, but
they ignore how they arrived at them. The person condemning incest in Haidt’s scenario can
justify her/his attitude with the claim that incest has negative consequences on the well-
being of the people involved, but that was not how her/his moral condemnation initially
arose. The person choosing the pair of socks on the right can justify her/his choice by men-
tioning some desirable features of that pair of socks, but she/he is not aware that the pos-
ition of the socks determined her/his choice.
This phenomenon is often explained by reference to a model of the brain (e.g. Gazza-
niga 1985) according to which the left hemisphere is responsible for constructing a post-hoc
commentary on one’s attitudes and actions. Gazzaniga describes this “interpreter module”
as a press secretary who provides a plausible account for events that were independently
generated. Reﬂection may rely on the interpreter module to identify reasons for attitudes
and choices that were made unconsciously. Because no introspective access to unconscious
mental processes is available, this form of reﬂection as post-hoc reconstruction does not
deliver an insight into the psychological mechanisms responsible for attitude formation
and for decision-making. However, being able to give reasons for one’s attitudes and
choices allows one to integrate them into a narrative that can then become true of the
self (Bortolotti 2009, 642). The person in Haidt’s study thinks of herself as someone
who condemns human practices when they have negative consequences, and the person
in Nisbett and Wilson’s study sees herself as someone who chooses socks for their bright-
ness and softness. These self-conceptions are likely to affect future attitudes and choices –
they are part of the transformative and creative process Tiberius was talking about.
Thus, reﬂection can lead to bad attitudes and bad choices in deliberation, and does not
necessarily reveal the causes of people’s attitudes and choices in justiﬁcation. But reﬂection
does contribute to the construction of coherent narratives about the self. This contribution
also needs to be assessed. McAdams (2008) reviews the evidence on the effects of reﬂecting
about one’s own life events and offers further reasons to believe that reﬂection is not to be
pursued in all circumstances. He observes how thinking about negative episodes can have
beneﬁcial effects (Pennebaker and Seagal 1999), but thinking about positive ones can
reduce well-being (Lyubomirsky, Sousa, and Dickerhoof 2006). Pennebaker and Seagal
argue that people organise and integrate thoughts and feelings into a coherent narrative
when they write about their own experiences. When they reﬂect in such a way about a trau-
matic experience, their coping process can be accelerated by allowing them to gain some
sense of control over that experience. In other words, these traumatic events become part
of a meaningful story.
Once anexperience has structure andmeaning, it wouldfollow thatthe emotional effectsof that
experience are more manageable. Constructing stories facilitates a sense of resolution, which
results in less rumination and eventually allows disturbing experiences to subside gradually
from conscious thought. (Pennebaker and Seagal 1999, 1243)
A more speciﬁc hypothesis is that narratives that produce enduring well-being in the long
run are those by which difﬁcult life events are interpreted as opportunities for self-
transformation:
Individuals who express high levels of eudaimonic well-being tend to frame especially difﬁcult
scenes in their life stories as transformative episodes wherein they experienced intense pain and
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pened personal relationships, and/or came to a more profound understanding of the world
in which they live. (Bauer, McAdams, and Pals 2008, 99)
What is reported to have physical and psychological beneﬁts is the construction of a certain
type of narrative (in written or oral form) which allows us to revisit stressful and negative
events and to process the emotions that these stirred (see also Goldie 2003). Other forms of
reﬂection, such as unstructured thought, are apparently much less beneﬁcial.
Contrary to studies on the effects of writing and talking, research overwhelmingly suggests that
thinking about traumatic life events does not result in beneﬁcial outcomes. The search for
meaning and understanding that typically follows the experience of a traumatic event –
although deemed necessary and beneﬁcial – unfortunately has the potential to degenerate
into a series of repetitive, negative, and intrusive thoughts. (Lyubomirsky, Sousa, and Dicker-
hoof 2006, 693)
The explanation for these results is supposed to rest on the organisation that linguistic
expression as opposed to non-structured thought imposes on experienced events. The nar-
rative structure helps to label emotions and construct an identity out of a lived experience.
But a narrative approach to positive life events can reduce well-being as people who sys-
tematically analyse happy moments look unnecessarily into causes or meanings of them.
Private thought can turn into “repetitivedwelling” and triggers memories ofthe experienced
event. When the experience to be reﬂected upon is positive, private thought enhances a
sense of well-being and life satisfaction because it encourages the person to experience
happy moments all over again. But when the experience the person dwells on is a negative
one, reliving the experienced emotions increases anxiety (for a different interpretation, see
Burton and King 2004).
In the literature on the role of reﬂection in narrative construction, two forms of reﬂection
are compared (e.g. imposing meaning over life events versus triggering previously
experienced feelings) and two types of effects are considered (e.g. increased or reduced
well-being due to repeated experience of past emotions versus increased or reduced well-
being due to search for meaning or coherence in life events) (Table 1).
The form of reﬂection that has been closely linked with action and decision-making in
the recent philosophical and psychological literature (e.g. Velleman 2006; Beach 2010) is
narrative analysis, which encourages the search for meaning and causal relationships
among life events. For instance, Velleman understands action and decision-making as
resting on the capacity to reﬂect on one’s values and commitments and identify with
them. Beach argues that thinking about or past events and experiences can determine (at
least in part) the sense of direction of one’s life. In particular, narratives can be used to
Table 1. Different forms of reﬂection in the construction of personal narratives and their effects.
Positive life event Negative life event
Narrative analysis
Searching for causes or
meaning in lived experiences
Reduced well-being: over-
analysing
Increased well-being: self-
transformation
Private thought
Dwelling on previously felt
emotions
Increased well-being: good
emotions re-experienced
Reduced well-being: bad
emotions re-experienced
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her future can then intervene to bring about desirable events or to prevent undesirable
events from happening. This capacity for projection into the future seems to be central to
contemporary accounts of autonomous thought and action. Clinical populations in which
such a capacity is compromised, because of memory deﬁcits or misattribution of salience
to personal events, exhibit difﬁculties in exercising agency (see Gerrans 2009; Kennett
and Matthews 2009; Bortolotti et al., forthcoming).
In this section, I reviewed some of the psychological evidence suggesting that reﬂection
does not contribute to good decision-making or to self-knowledge. Although the studies on
introspective reﬂection and on narrative self-construction deliver important insights into the
limitations of certain forms of reﬂection for certain purposes, I have also attempted to show,
on the basis of previous work by Tiberius (2008) and Bortolotti (2009), that thinking about
the reasons for one’s attitudes and choices has signiﬁcant beneﬁts. Moreover, with reference
to already identiﬁed linksamong narrative self-construction and self-knowledge, and auton-
omous agency, I have suggested that narrative analysis is instrumental to making sense of
past experiences and projecting oneself into the future.
Reﬂective deliberation may be manipulated by biased evidence and be blind to factors
relevant to people’s choices but not available to introspection. Similarly, reﬂective justiﬁca-
tion does not always unveil the psychological mechanisms responsible for people’s
attitudes and decisions, as unconscious processes that are not open to introspective analysis
might be part of the causal story. Reﬂecting on one’s life involves a reconstruction rather
than a faithful description of the relevant events, and, when it encourages dwelling on
negative emotions, it can negatively affect well-being. But reﬂection in many of its
forms (deliberation, justiﬁcation, analysis, and re-interpretation of life events) is also impor-
tant for the process of creation of the self that underscores agency, and that allows people to
see themselves as protagonists of a story with meaning and direction.
4. Do experts think?
The relationship between intuition and reﬂection in good decision-making has also been
investigated by the literature on expertise in the context of education, management,
sports, chess, and many other domains. The suggestion is that no reﬂective exercise accom-
panies the expert execution of a task or the making of a good decision (Dreyfus and Dreyfus
1986). This view is inspired by the phenomenological tradition according to which action is
guided by experience and by the interaction with the environment. Just like Wittgenstein’s
ladder, reﬂection may be instrumental to gaining experience of a certain domain at ﬁrst, but
it is not the means by which people make decisions when they have become experts. Their
extensive experience crystallises into habit, and no further deliberation is required. As the
typical description of the wise person is that of a good decision-maker who can successfully
integrate different skills, the literature on expertise is prima facie relevant to accounts of
wisdom, and in particular, it can help establish what type of psychological processes
lead to good choices.
Here are some examples of the reaction against the perceived over-conceptualisation of
expert decision-making:
The view of expert decision making presented here is perceptual rather than conceptual. It is
more a matter of how people see the world than the knowledge that they have accumulated.
The reason is that knowledge, to be useful, must be translated into action. From a pragmatic
perspective, decision making and problem solving are based on situation awareness, on the
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ated with that recognition. (Hutton and Klein 1999, 32–3)
[W]ith enough experience in a variety of situations, all seen from the same perspective but
requiring different tactical decisions, the brain of the expert performer gradually decomposes
this class of situations into subclasses, each of which shares the same action. This allows
the immediate intuitive situational response that is characteristic of expertise. (Dreyfus 2002,
372).
Expert decision making seems removed from explicit deliberation, unlike novices who rely on
explicit instruction when learning a new task. Linked to this, speed of performance increases
notably with expertise, whereas novices are slow and deliberate. Experts can multi-task and
engage in other activities while making expert decisions, whereas novices can be easily dis-
tracted from tasks with which they are unfamiliar. Recognition of visual stimuli and its categ-
orization shifts up a level in speed once one has become expert through repeated experience,
allowing experts to respond to and categorize subordinate-level stimuli almost instantaneously.
(Nee and Meenaghan 2006, 938)
On the phenomenological view, coping skills are non-representational because they are elicited
directly by signiﬁcant cues in the environment. The agent’s response is not generated by rep-
resentational thought. Her activity is not motivated by a conscious desire to move toward an
explicitly represented goal. She simply responds, in a skillful way, to a world that has
become meaningful because of her engagement with it. (Ennen 2003, 317)
What is expert decision-making? Hutton and Klein (1999) list the main characteristics:
(1) expertise is domain-speciﬁc; (2) in comparison with novices, experts do not necessarily
have a wider knowledge base, but are better able to perceive patterns; (3) expert perform-
ance is faster than that of novices and virtually error-free; (4) experts have superior memory
in their domain of expertise, and this is not necessarily all “in their heads” but recalled when
needed by means of external cues; (5) experts have a deeper understanding of the problem
to solve (e.g. they catch on the causal mechanisms), whereas novices are distracted by
superﬁcial features of the problem; (6) experts have a better understanding of their own
limitations and an ability to catch themselves when they commit errors; (7) through
years of experience, experts acquire the ability to perceive relevant features of the situation
(distinguish typical features from exceptions, make ﬁne discriminations, antecedents, and
consequences).
There is sufﬁcient overlap between elements of expertise and common conceptions of
wisdom to justify a closer look at the literature on expert decision-making: the in-depth
understanding of situations, the knowledge of one’s own limitations, and the focus on rel-
evant factors at the expense of superﬁcial features of a problem are all typical features of
the wise person. But there are also important differences: one concerns the domain speci-
ﬁcity of expertise which seems to clash with a conception of wisdom according to which
the wise person exhibits good decision-making in more than one domain. Different
approaches to this difference can be suggested. The wise person can be considered an
expert in more than one domain, or in a single domain that encompasses all important
life choices. For instance, Baltes and Smith (1990, 95) propose that wise people are
experts in the domain of “fundamental life pragmatics (e.g. life planning, life manage-
ment, life review)”. Although it is implausible to suppose that the wise person behaves
like an expert whenever she makes a decision, depending on the preferred account of
wisdom, she may qualify as an expert in decisions about the good life. In any case, not
any expert is a wise person, but models of expertise can be and have been used as
models of wise decision-making.
Does Reﬂection Lead to Wise Choices? 307One of the interesting issues surrounding expertise is how one can become an expert
and gain those advantages (with respect to novices) listed by Hutton and Klein (1999).
In accordance with a model where recognition of patterns has a primary role, and solutions
or decision are arrived at fast, Hutton and Klein identify four key elements in the acquisition
of expertise:
(1) variable awkward performance becomes consistent, accurate, complete, and relatively fast;
(2) individual acts and judgments are integrated into overall strategies; (3) perceptual learning
occurs so that a focus on isolated variables shifts to perception of complex patterns; (4) there is
an increased self-reliance and ability to form new strategies when required. (Hutton and Klein
1999, 35)
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) develop a different model of the acquisition of expertise in
ﬁve stages: the novice who relies on surface features of the situation and context-free rules;
(2) the advanced beginner who starts perceiving patterns but cannot discriminate between
relevant and irrelevant features; (3) the competent decision-maker who can cope with a
variety of situations via deliberate planning; (4) the proﬁcient decision-makerwho sees situ-
ations holistically and arrives at her judgement by exercising her perceptual skills; (5) the
expert who has an intuitive understanding of the situation and uses analysis only when pro-
blems occur or when the situation is unfamiliar.
Along similar lines, Wheeler (2005) makes a distinction between online and ofﬂine
intelligence. Online intelligence primarily serves to control action (Wheeler’s example is
navigating a path without bumping into things) and “produces a suite of ﬂuid and ﬂexible
real-time adaptive responses to incoming sensory stimuli” (12). Ofﬂine intelligence is at
work when we reﬂect and speculate (Wheeler’s example is thinking about what the
weather is going to be like in Paris). According to Wheeler, orthodox cognitive psychology
has adopted the Cartesian model that privileges ofﬂine over online intelligence, but we
should really abandon the assumption that the former is primary and accept that most of
what we do as agents is guided by the latter. Wheeler does not deny that some of our
decisions are guided by explicit reﬂection, but, as in Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), the
use of reﬂection is supposed to be the exception to the rule rather than the norm.
Inthese accounts, there is an obvious challenge to the assumptions made by the classical
approach to decision-making (characterised by intellectualist rationalism), where analysis
and reﬂection were regarded as the best normative standards for arriving at good decisions,
and heuristics and biases were presented as cheap and dirty shortcuts. The alternative
between intuition and reﬂection was described as involving a trade-off: intuition delivers
faster results at the expense of accuracy and reliability. In the theories of expert choice sup-
ported by the recent psychological evidence, the focus is on the perceptual and recogni-
tional elements of decision-making. The strategies adopted by experts are the result of
extensive experience, and when they are used, they allow experts to capture the most
salient features of the situation. No trade-off is necessary: using intuition is both a faster
and a more accurate way to make good decisions than relying on analysis and reﬂection.
The challenge to the classical approach is often interpreted as a signiﬁcant turn in cognitive
science: not only expert decision-making needs no reﬂection, it needs no representation
either. This further claim is taken to mark the end of the dominant role of representational
theories in action explanation and topromote a “reconciliation ofcognitive science and phe-
nomenology” (Ennen 2003, 322).
It is important to draw attention to those decisions and actions that are not guided by
explicit thinking and recognise that some of what experts do is due to their well-trained
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on the preferred theory of expertise and the correspondent terminology. However, the
turn against representationalism seems too extreme. First, as we saw in some of the
models of the acquisition of expertise, it is necessary for the decision-maker to engage
in analysis in order to become an expert. The form of analysis is based on accurate rep-
resentations of the situation in which the decision is made and is part of the process by
which people acquire the right “habits”. Decision-makers might not need to engage in
explicit deliberation by the time they have gained their expertise, but, as Dreyfus and
Dreyfus (1986) and Hutton and Klein (1999) concede, they would never have arrived
at that stage without extensive practice, obtained by means of increasingly tuned analysis
and deliberation.
That said, the role reserved by Wheeler (2005) to analysis in the decision of actual
experts seems too limited. Even Klein (1997), who developed the so-called Recognition
Primed Decision-Making (RPD) model, concedes that experts engage in some analysis
and employ reasoning strategies. In particular, it is a central feature of the RPD model
that experts form a mental representation of the situation in order to assess it. Their
domain knowledge informs the mental representation, which in turn contributes to the
quality of the decision. Sutton et al. (2011) argue that distinguishing between reﬂection
and intuition may not be so straightforward. They observe that thinking does not occur
exclusively when the ﬂow of embodied coping breaks down, as an exception to the rule,
but it is used in the course of the expert’s well-established routines when she reviews pat-
terns of movement, affect, or mood which contribute to the expert choice or action. Their
suggestion is that when thought, verbal clues, and memory interact in decision-making, the
perceived dichotomy between reﬂection and mindfulness on the one hand, and intuitive and
habitual behaviour on the other, is too simplistic.
There is much to learn from the shift of emphasis from reﬂection (intended as explicit
analysis) to intuition (intended as a perceptual and recognitional skills shaped by prior
experience). The wise person may be the one who has internalised the principles of
good decision-making, so that these need not be explicitly recalled whenever a new
decision is made. But if we take the domain of expertise of the wise person to be the
good life, or something similarly wide-ranging, then current models of expertise may
need to be adapted before they can shed light on what wisdom requires. For instance,
the need for adjusting “established routines” to the context of the decision to be
made, which is highlighted by Sutton et al. (2011), may be more pronounced in the
case of the wise person engaging with potentially heterogeneous decisions about the
good life than in the case of the expert engaging with other narrower and more speciﬁc
problems.
In this section, I reviewed some of the psychological evidence according to which
reﬂection plays a minor role in the making of expert decisions. Although the literature
on expertise shakes previously unchallenged assumptions about decision-making being
ruled by analysis, it does not succeed in showing that analysis is useless to the decision-
maker by the time expertise has been gained. By comparing different models of expert
choice, I have suggested that analysis may still be required at different stages of the
decision-making process and of the acquisition of expertise – even more so in a context
where the unpredictability and complexity of the problems to be solved make it harder
to adopt pre-established routines blindly. On the basis of the work by Sutton et al.
(2011), a more radical view would involve challenging the dichotomy between intuition
and reﬂection in the actual process of decision-making, and arguing that analysis and
habit co-exist in a complex relationship whenever experts make choices.
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There seem to be different conceptions of the relationship between reﬂection and intuition,
and they cut across the philosophical and the cognitive science literature:
(1) Pro reﬂection. Reﬂection is slower but more accurate, so using intuition instead
requires a trade-off: faster and more computationally economic processes in
exchange for less accurate decisions. Stop and think!
(2) Pro intuition. Intuition is more accurate than reﬂection in delivering good
decisions, and it is also less vulnerable to evidence manipulation and confabulation.
Go with the ﬂow!
(3) Against the dichotomy. Reﬂection and intuition should not be characterised as
dichotomous. Conscious and unconscious, fast and slow, perceptual and analytic
reasoning processes interact in the making of good decisions.
By taking a brief look at philosophical work on good decision-making that is sensitive
to the psychological evidence, I have attempted to show that the interpretation of the
psychological studies should not be radicalised into a complete rejection of reﬂection.
Not all of what people do is guided by explicit deliberation, and there are many strategies
for forming attitudes, making choices, and solving problems which are reliable and accu-
rate, computationally undemanding and opaque to introspection. That said, there seems
to be a role for reﬂection. When the evidence available to the decision-maker is not manipu-
lated, when meaning is imposed on life events with the purpose of constructing a coherent
conception of the self, and when recognitional and perceptual skills honed via experience
need to be adapted to novel or complex situations, then reﬂection may be not just beneﬁcial
but also required.
My impression from the discussion so far is that we need both reﬂective and intuitive
processes for good decision-making. It does make sense to distinguish between reﬂection
and intuition, at least in some contexts, and it is important to highlight strengths and limit-
ations of both ways of generating attitudes and choices for one’s given purposes. The atti-
tudes and choices arrived at via introspective reﬂection may need to be “corrected” by
knowledge of one’s unconscious psychological tendencies and reasoning biases – e.g.
awareness of position effects can help customers choose better-quality products in their
daily shopping. The attitudes and choices arrived at via intuition may need to be analysed
in order to be integrated into a personal narrative and be made sense of, especially when
they are self-deﬁning – e.g. in moral decision-making, following intuitions on a case-by-
case basis without reﬂecting on one’s broader theoretical commitments can lead to incon-
sistent and poorly justiﬁed choices.
But for the purposes of this paper, it is not so important which account of the relation-
ship between reﬂection and intuition we favour, but how we plan to settle the issue. I started
with a methodological question about the relationship between philosophy and cognitive
sciences. Can these disciplines genuinely interact? They certainly seem to interact in the
literature on decision-making. We reviewed interpretation of data about powers and limit-
ations of introspective reﬂection in everyday attitude formation and justiﬁcation, about the
role of analysis and private thought in narrative self-construction, and about the scope of
analytic deliberation in expert decision-making. This literature helps understand what
wisdom requires and provides insights into causal mechanisms underlying people’s
verbal and non-verbal behaviour that in non-experimental settings would be the object of
mere speculation.
310 Lisa BortolottiThe psychological literature offers a complex and layered view of human capacities in
decision-making, and if results are interpreted in the light of the relevant philosophical
interests (e.g. what we need to do in order to attain wisdom), they can serve as powerful
constraints on philosophical theories.
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